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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KURT SNEDEKER, 
Petitioner/Appellant, : 
Case No. 20070078-CA 
v. 
NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah 
State Driver License Division, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Appeal from the Final Judgment of the Second Judicial District Court in and for 
Weber County, State of Utah, Honorable Parley R. Baldwin, Presiding 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of 
the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, affirming the 
administrative suspension of petitioner's driver license for driving under the influence of 
alcohol (R. 23-26). The order was signed on February 13 and entered on the court's 
docket February 14, 2007, following trial de novo. Under Utah R. App. P. 4(c), 
petitioner's notice of appeal (R. 18-19), filed January 19, 2007, after the court announced 
its decision from the bench on December 20, 2007, is deemed filed on the date of entry of 
the court's final order and is therefore timely. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 
2004) gives this Court appellate jurisdiction over the district court's review of the 
informal adjudicative proceedings before the Driver License Division. 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. The traffic stop leading to petitioner's arrest for driving under the influence of 
alcohol was legally justified under the Fourth Amendment. This issue was preserved in 
both parties' arguments before the district court (R. 22 at 10-17). 
Standard of Review: A trial court's determination of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness is a question of law reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the 
trial court's application of this legal standard to the historical facts. State v. Brake, 2004 
UT 95, t 15, 103 P.3d 699, 703; see also State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26,1f 8, 112 P.3d 
507, 509. 
2. The district court did not need to reach the legality of the traffic stop in order to 
sustain the administrative suspension of petitioner's driver license. This issue was 
preserved in both parties' arguments before the district court (R. 22 at 2-4, 11-13). 
Standard of Review: This issue arises for the first time on appeal as a result of the 
district court's rationale. Consequently, the decision on appeal is de novo. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the 
issue before the Court is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
After petitioner's arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol on August 20, 
2006, and an administrative hearing, the Driver License Division entered an order on 
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September 13, 2O06 (R. 5), suspending his driver license for a period of one year, 
effective September 19, 2006. Following petitioner's request for administrative review, 
the Division sustained the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law in a 
letter dated October 16, 2006 (Add. A).1 Petitioner then sought de novo review in the 
district court. The trial court noted the parties' stipulation that the sole issue for 
determination was the legality of the traffic stop that led to petitioner's arrest (R. 24), and 
ruled that the stop was reasonable (R. 25, Conclusions of Law at K 1). Based on the 
parties' further stipulation that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest petitioner 
for driving under the influence of alcohol (R. 25, Conclusions of Law at j^ 2), that 
petitioner's breath alcohol level exceeded .08 (R. 25, Conclusions of Law at ^ 3), and that 
petitioner was personally served with notice of intent to suspend or revoke his license 
(R. 25, Conclusions of Law at ^ 4), the court affirmed the order of suspension (R. 25, 
Order at ^ 2). This appeal ensued (R. 18-19). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
On August 20, 2006, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Ryan Gurney was on duty at 
approximately 11:30 p.m. when he pulled behind petitioner's car, which was stopped at a 
traffic light (R. 22 at 5:6-20). At that time, he performed a license plate check and 
'The letter was filed in the course of the administrative proceedings underlying this 
case. The Court can take judicial notice of the record of this administrative proceeding. 
See Moore v. Utah Technical Coll, 727 P.2d 634, 638 n.17 (Utah 1986) (taking judicial 
notice of administrative rules and regulations as well as published accounts of 
administrative proceedings and actions). 
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determined that the database was unable to locate insurance for the vehicle (R. 22 at 
5:20-22). Relying on this information, Trooper Gumey followed the vehicle through the 
intersection after the light turned green and stopped it less than two blocks later to 
determine whether the vehicle was, in fact, uninsured (R. 22 at 6:8-25). At that time 
petitioner, the driver, produced valid proof of insurance (R. 22 at 7:1-2). However, 
Trooper Gumey observed the strong odor of alcohol coming from petitioner and began an 
investigation for driving under the influence, which ultimately led to petitioner's arrest 
(R. 24, Findings of Fact at ^ 2). Petitioner has stipulated that the Trooper had probable 
cause for the arrest, that his breath alcohol exceeded the legal limit, and that he was 
properly advised of the Division's intent to suspend or revoke his license (R. 25, 
Conclusions of Law at fflf 2-4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah law requires that all motor vehicles operated on Utah's highways or quasi-
public roads or parking areas be insured. Operating a vehicle without security is a 
violation of law. When Trooper Gurley was notified that no insurance was found for 
petitioner's vehicle, he reasonably suspected that the vehicle was being operated in 
violation of law. Stopping the vehicle to verify or dispel that reasonable suspicion was 
warranted by the facts known to Trooper Gurley. Because the stop of the vehicle was 
supported by reasonable suspicion, the district court correctly concluded that the 
subsequent investigation and resulting suspension of petitioner's driver license were 
lawful. 
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In the alternative, this Court may affirm the district court's decision on the ground 
that, because the exclusionary rule does not apply to the administrative suspension of 
driver licenses, the lawfulness of the traffic stop is irrelevant to validity of the suspension, 
and the district court should not have reached the issue. Under either rationale, the 
decision affirming the suspension merits affirmance here. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FACT THAT NO INSURANCE WAS FOUND FOR THE 
VEHICLE PETITIONER WAS DRIVING CONSTITUTES 
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT IT WAS BEING DRIVEN IN 
VIOLATION OF LAW. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-301(2) (West Supp. 2006) mandates that every owner or 
operator of a motor vehicle (other than a properly registered off-road vehicle) on Utah's 
highways or quasi-public roads or parking areas within the state shall maintain owner's or 
operator's security. Under Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-103(9) (West 2004), "[o]wner's or 
operator's security" means an insurance policy or surety bond meeting statutory coverage 
limits and other requirements, a deposit with the state treasurer meeting statutorily 
specified criteria, a statutorily compliant certificate of self-funded coverage, or a policy 
issued by the statutory Risk Management Fund, which covers certain government-owned 
property. Violation of the surety requirement constitutes a class B misdemeanor. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302(l) (West 2004). 
When Trooper Gurley performed a license plate check on the vehicle petitioner 
was operating, his computer showed that no insurance was found for the vehicle (R. 24, 
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Findings of Fact at f^ 1). Based on this information, he had reasonable, individualized 
suspicion that the vehicle was being driven in violation of law. Under the Fourth 
Amendment, this reasonable, individualized suspicion was sufficient to justify Trooper 
Gurley's stop of the vehicle to determine whether it was, in fact, insured. 
Petitioner argues that Trooper Gurley lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his 
vehicle because there were possible innocent explanations for the indication that no 
insurance was found for the vehicle. The Utah Supreme Court has rejected this 
proposition. In State v. Markland, the court observed that "it is settled law that an officer 
is not obligated to rule out innocent conduct prior to initiating an investigatory detention. 
This is because the public interest in investigating criminal activity is sufficiently 
important to justify the minimal intrusion into personal security that such investigatory 
detentions entail." Markland, 2005 UT 26, % 17, 112 P.3d at 511 (citing United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 and 273 (2002)) (internal citations omitted). The court 
recognized that M[a]s long as the underlying facts, and reasonable inferences drawn from 
those facts, justify the conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed at the inception of the 
level-two stop, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied." Id. at f^ 19, 112 P.3d at 511. The 
court further noted that "[ijndeed, 'the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the 
level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.m Id. at |^ 10, 112 P.3d at 510 (quoting Arvizu, 
534 U.S. at 274). 
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' 1 1 le state' s si lpi ei i le coi n 11 las also agi • se d tv it! i tl le I h lited States Supreme Court 
tj iat "as leu lg as an officer suspects that the !di ivcr is violiilmf am nm < >l lh< miilliliuli I  
applicable traffic and equipment regulations/ the police officer may legally stop the 
vehicle." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d ]]?n. 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting Delaware i > Prouse, 
See also Commonwealth v. Bolton, 2003 PA Super 314, 831 A.2d 734 | lioldinr Ikul a 
computer reanoui indicating lack o\ required InMiKim e *»' \ chicle provides artKuiaLle 
and r^acoii«i>ii, £-i- - ^ s to stop veliiv u -\iotarnoimt toprH <i
 u MI^I 2003 PA Super 
the stop—that no insurance was found in the database for the vehicle petitioner was 
driving—provided reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was being driven in violation of 
reasonable inference the trooper drew from that information. 
The district court correctly concluded tl iat because no insurance was found foi the 
\ chick uhUi liowj-; i;u;k\ cmcicd.^ i.vuoi platemimk. n -• uic database, the stop 
II| milt I, i hide w ;r» n asmiahli 1 himli i (lie st.tnd.'tnk intii iiliitul iiii 1 llali privedrms iiiln 
district court's conclusion warrants affirmance. 
II. IN THfc Ai. 1 i .R.NATIVE, THIS COURT CAN AFFIRM ON THE 
GROUND THA'l THh l.XCU ?SIO\ARY R I II E DOES NOT APPI Y 1 0 
ADMINISTF^'V^ A r n n v , 
Although both parties raised the applicability of the i -*. 
arguments tc > the district court i'R 22 at 2:23-25, 3:4 - 4:1 \ J, the court did not address the 
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rule in its decision; instead, after concluding that the traffic stop was supported by 
reasonable suspicion, it relied on the parties' stipulation that, if the stop was lawful, 
Trooper Gurley had probable cause to arrest petitioner for driving under the influence of 
alcohol; that petitioner's breath alcohol level exceeded .08; and that petitioner was 
personally served with notice of the Division's intent to suspend or revoke his driver 
license. However, this Court may affirm the district court's decision on any ground 
supported by the record. See First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 
1993). 
Because the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings, the district court 
did not need to reach the validity of the traffic stop in order to sustain the suspension of 
petitioner's driver license.2 This Court, likewise, need not reach the validity of the stop, 
2The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to extend the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule to civil proceedings. See Pa. Bd. of Probation and Parole 
v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 353 (1998) (holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to adult parole 
proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (declining to extend 
exclusionary rule to civil tax proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 
349-52 (1974) (declining to apply exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings); State ex 
rel A.R., 1999 UT 43, ^  20, 982 P.2d 73, 78 (holding exclusionary rule does not apply in 
child protection proceedings); State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 269, f 7, 987 P.2d 1284, 
1286 (holding exclusionary rule does not apply in adult probation revocation 
proceedings). The sole exception is One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 
693 (1965), in which the exclusionary rule was held applicable in a nominally civil 
forfeiture proceeding that was found to be quasi-criminal in nature because of its punitive 
purpose. The Utah Supreme Court has already held that license revocation proceedings 
are intended to protect the public, not to punish, and that they are not quasi-criminal. 
Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302, 1304-05 (Utah 1979); see generally Michelle L. Hornish, 
Note, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule, 65 Mo. L. Rev. 533, 542 (2000) (concluding that 
a majority of states does not apply the exclusionary rule in administrative license 
hearings). 
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parties' stipulation, established all the statutory criteria necessary to sustain the 
suspension 'YPi '• hether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person 
was driving a nK1- ^ . - s . .;, .....s'.i,.,,-•; NV*.1M»I, n - w r i i . .ng under the *• ^-lence 
, i |
 t|i n | in | in ulnir d *'i i i h i-i >' I ' I M ' I i n ' 1 *-" i l l . \\ . i r . r >u 11• 11• . ><• 11<* 11*• I s u h M a i i i < i Ilm 
bodvj, {a i whether the person refused to submit to the [chemical] test; and (ii» ,!iu test 
icnilK if an) " T Ttah Code Ann. § 53-3-223(4Vr) fWVst °004) \ffirming on this ground 
. . , - .*; » ^ 
suspension's leg a; 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner •••• n- » •;<* wn error n ,hc dntiicUuiiit - UJIKHIMUII that the traffic stop 
i ; 
' - < - . • - • i 
However, because the Jcgalitv ul the slop is inele\aiu lo JAC \aiidity oi the administrative 
suspension of petitioner's driver license, the Court may affirm without reaching its merits. 
I c i it! iese i e asoi is, as i i ill;; explaii led abov e, I e spoi idei it i e specti i illy i equests the Court to 
affirm judgment in her favor. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Respondent/appellee does not believe oral argument is necessary to the 
correct disposition of this case, but desires to participate if oral argument is ordered by the 
Court. 
Dated this XL day of May, 2007. 
Nancy L. Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
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CERTIFIC A i L Of M. UJ,;,\V, 
1 hereby certify that on this ^\ov. da\ of May, 2007,1 caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to 
the following: 
iv vvesi Broadvva). Sink '^ '••» 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
>WtA^ S ; U4?W/L. - - -
U 
A 
Benjamin A Hamilton 
Attorney at Law 
10 W Broadway, Ste 810 
Salt Lake City, I IT 84101 
Ikhiki 10, .'OIK' 
RE: Kurt Benton Snedeker 
Utah File No. 150004330 
Arrest Date: 08-20-06 
Healing Date: 09-18-06 
Birth Date: 05-10-72 
Deai Mi 1 1 ai r iih > ' 
T h e Administrative Reconsideration Board (ARB) has received your request for J 
review in behalf of Mr. Snedeker. They have reviewed the findings of the hearing officer 
regarding t h e above-mentioned arrest date. They sustain the findings offset and 
conclusion o f law made by the hearing officer 
Y o u may consider this review to have exhausted all administrative avenues of 
in d i d available to you, and may appeal t o the District Court,, 
Administrative Reconsideration Boai c! 
Dri vei License Division 
